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My claim that the reduction step for case (2) of maximal formulas with reductio
and non-contradiction ‘does only what it is supposed to do: it removes one
maximal formula and introduces no complications’ (Kürbis, 2021, 548) was rash,
as pointed out to me by Pedro del Valle-Inclan.1 If there are more assumptions
in the assumption class [+ A]i than the one displayed in the original deduction
(occurring as top formulas in Π′ and Π′′), then these remain undischarged in
the reduced deduction. In this note I give a solution to the problem. But first,
two further corrections:
p.549, line 9f: ‘the right premise is not conclusion of an elimination rule’ should
read ‘the right premise is not maximal’ (that is, it is not conclusion of + ∨ E,
− ∧ E or reductio).
p.550, line 11: ‘reductio’ should be ‘non-contradiction’.
Reduction step (1) for maximal formulas with reductio and non-contradiction
also works in case some of the formulas discharged by reductio are premises of





























1To whom also many thanks for discussion.
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with further formulas in assumption class i left implicit. The case to be avoided
is that applying the reduction step introduces maximal formulas of the same
degree as the one removed: in the example, this happens if Π′ and Σ conclude
− A and + A by introduction rules, or if Π′ concludes − A by reductio, + ∨ E or
− ∧ E and Σ concludes + A by one of these rules, too. If both are concluded by
introduction rules, remove them as part of the reduction step by applying the
appropriate procedure given under case (d) of the reduction steps for maximal
formulas; the latter break up formulas into subformulas and thus any resulting
new maximal formulas are of lower degree than the one removed. In the
other cases, the conclusion − A of Π′ is itself maximal, but of one degree lower
than the maximal formula − A to be removed. Recall that if both premises of
non-contradiction are maximal, the degree of the right premises is the degree of
the formula plus 1. Thus applying the reduction procedure increases the degree
of the conclusion − A of Π′ by one, as afterwards it stands to the right of another
maximal formula. The strategy of the proof of Theorem 1 requires applying the
reduction steps to maximal formulas of highest degree such that none others of
that degree stand above it. So all maximal formulas above the lower − A have at
most its degree qua formula (i.e. counting only the number of connectives). Thus
one way of dealing with this problem is to remove all maximal formulas of that
degree that stand above the lower − A before applying the reduction step that
removes it. More economical would be to focus only on the troublesome cases
and to remove all and only those maximal formulas that are premises of non-
contradiction the other premise of which is in assumption class i before applying
the reduction step that removes the lower − A. A better solution altogether may,
however, be to introduce a special measure taking care of maximal formulas
that are conclusions of reductio and premises of non-contradiction. The above
strategy effectively requires a subsidiary induction to show that, while the lower
maximal formula − A is kept fixed, the other maximal formulas of its degree
qua formula that stand above it are removable from the deduction. The more
economical strategy could use a method similar to that employed by Stålmarck
in his normalisation proof for unilateral classical logic (Stålmarck, 1991) and
associate the maximal formulas that are the conclusion of reductio and premise
of non-contradiction with those assumptions discharged by reductio that are
premises of non-contradiction and stand next to formulas that are themselves
maximal.
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